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Abstract—Computational privacy is a property of crypto-
graphic system that ensures the privacy of data being processed
at an untrusted server. Fully Homomorphic Encryption Schemes
(FHE) promise to provide such property. Contemporary FHE
schemes are suited for applications that have single user and
server. In reality many of the cloud applications involve multiple
users with various degrees of trust and the server need not
necessarily be aware of it too. We present a Complementary Key
Pairs technique and protocols based on that to scale any generic
FHE schemes to multi user scenarios. We also use such technique
along with FHE to show how attribute based access control can
be achieved while server being oblivious of the same. We analyze
the protocols and their security. Our protocols don’t make any
assumptions on how FHE scheme itself works.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is well defined and standardized [1].
The major hindrance for cloud adoption is still computational
privacy. It is a property of cryptographic system that ensures
the privacy of data being processed at a remote untrusted
server.
Informally in a cloud computing setup, Alice has inputs
{xi} to a function f to which she needs results, but lacks
enough resources to compute the output. Sally, a service
provider, has resources to execute f(x) and is willing to let
Alice use them may be for a price. Similar to any Cloud
Service Provider like Google’s Compute Engine, Amazon’s
WebServices etc. Alice is concerned though that Sally would
misuse the data. We assume Alice trusts Sally to give her the
right answer of f(xi) though.
To address such concern, one needs cryptographic tech-
niques that allow arbitrary functions to be evaluated on en-
crypted data. So that Alice can send encrypted inputs {x1i }
and Sally could perform functions on such encrypted data.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) schemes provide such
functionality. They are proven to be practical by Gentry [2].
Current FHE schemes are highly inefficient and still not yet
feasible.[3].
Informally, FHE schemes allows one to perform funda-
mentally addition,multiplication over the cipher texts without
ever decrypting the inputs. Apart from the keygen, encrypt,
decrypt algorithms of Public Key Encryption (PKE) systems,
FHE schemes consist of an additional algorithm evaluate.
Evaluate method takes input as any arbitrary function f in
boolean circuit form, encrypted inputs of f and executes it
over encrypted data using the Public Key. The output is still
in encrypted form.
Cf = evaluatePK(f, C1, C2, ...., Cn) (I.1)
A. Problem
Adopting FHE schemes for cloud applications that involves
just one user and server is straightforward the data can be
encrypted using the Public key and outsourced to the server,
the server can then perform operations using Evaluate method
and Public key and return the results that are still in encrypted
form. The user then decrypts the results using Private Key.
But most of the cloud applications involve multiple users
collaboratively utilizing a service. Encrypting data with their
individual Public keys would not result in encrypted data that
can be operated upon by them collectively.
B. Straw man Solution
In order to make the encrypted data coherent even after
encryptions by multiple users, all the users can have same
key pair for encryption and decryption. But this would lose
accountability and causes single point of failure. In addition
collaboration based on different degrees of trust that needs
access control measures cannot be enforced.
So we precisely need techniques to keep the data coherent
even encrypted by multiple users but still each user is account-
able for their operations. Additional access control measures
also should be enforced easily.
C. Key Contributions
1) We introduce Complementary Key Pairs technique
that involves two distinct key pairs that complement
each other to achieve the desired functionality.
2) We design protocols for scaling FHE schemes for
multi user scenarios and analyze their security using
such technique.
3) We also show how Server Oblivious - Attribute Based
Access Control (SO-ABAC) can be achieved over
encrypted data using such technique.
II. PRIOR ART
Current popularly published FHE schemes are suited for
single user utilizing some cloud service, they are not for
multiuser.
Xiao et all proposed protocols for Multi User systems [4],
that are based on symmetric Homomorphic Encryption scheme
that could evaluate functions only on polynomials. Also their
protocols are tightly coupled with their scheme.
Also set of literature exists for achieving multi party com-
putation using threshold homomorphic encryption [5],[6] and
also multikey homomorphic encryption [7]. These techniques
require few of the users to collaborate to decrypt the final
result, which is not reasonable to assume especially in the
cloud setup.
Non interactive Verifiable Computation [8] is another con-
cept introduced to verify the computations when they are
outsourced. Such techniques have been adopted for multiuser
scenario too by Choi et all [9]. The multi user protocols in-
troduced here encrypt the same input under multiple identities
and stored as a map, this would not scale when the number of
users or the input data increases in size.
Dijk and Juels argue FHE alone cannot solve cloud privacy
problems[10].They prove that, realization of private multi-
client scenario is equivalent to impossibility results of pro-
gram obfuscation. They assume, in multi client scenario the
encryption is done with different Public keys. They also state
that functionality beyond FHE is needed like Access Control
over cipher texts and Re-encryption to achieve such private
multi-client scenarios.
Their impossibility proof makes an assumption that isnt
true in our case. In our protocols, even in multi client scenario
the encryption of data is done by single Public key and
authentication of users is done with different individual key
pair. Also we prove (by construction) that such additional
functionality is purely application of FHE. Our protocols are
counter examples to their core results.
Access control over encrypted data is achieved using
Attribute Based Encryption schemes [11] [12]. Such tech-
niques in combination with Proxy Reencryption schemes were
adopted to cloud setting [13]. Such adaptations are complex in
nature for practical implementation. Also Receiver Oblivious
Attribute Based Access Control has been achieved through
attribute based encryption [14] and this does not fit in cloud
setup.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Users
In all of the below protocols, Alice, Bob, Carol are typical
Cloud Service Consumers, can be an individual or an enter-
prise. Sally is a typical Cloud Service Provider like Google,
Amazon or any other provider.
B. Services
The service can be based on any of the Infrastructure-
as-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-Service(PaaS), Software-as-
Service(SaaS) delivery methods [1].
C. Adversaries
In real world multiple adversaries exist, the cloud platform
itself, somebody compromising cloud platform, neighbors
sharing the platform can be malicious. Such differentiation is
not important though if proper computational privacy measures
are in place. Abstractly such adversaries can be modeled as
single adversary, Mallory.
D. Attacks
The goal of Mallory is to get unauthorized access to plain
text and/or to corrupt the cipher text. Mallory can compromise
the cloud platform itself or exploit a flaw in the protocol to
achieve such goal.
E. Outline
We start with a trivial protocol for Alice to outsource her
data 1 to Sally while ensuring computational privacy of the
same. We introduce the concept of Complementary Key Pairs.
We then present protocol for Alice to collaboratively work
with Bob on shared data using such technique. Using this
protocol both Alice,Bob can execute arbitrary operations on
encrypted data. Further we present a protocol that allows Sally
to enforce oblivious access control over Alice’s data when
multiple users are present. They are analyzed for possible
attacks and vulnerabilities.
F. Basic Assumptions
• Alice, Bob and Sally know each other’s public keys 2.
• Alice, Bob and Sally mutually authenticate each other
• Sally knows legible partners of Alice through some
initial configuration.
• All the communications take place on a secure channel
Note: Protocols stated here are for illustration purposes,
mainly to drive the point. Security is discussed only for the
functionality they represent to solve in this context. Conven-
tions followed in protocols are detailed in Table I
IV. BASIC PROTOCOL
In this protocol, we consider the basic scenario where only
two parties are involved, Alice the user and Sally the service
provider.
A. Summary
Alice encrypts the data using her Public Key and uploads
( i.e outsources) it to Sally. At any later point of time,
Alice requests various operations on the encrypted data using
API’s provided by Sally. Sally performs the operations on
the encrypted data using FHE Scheme’s Evaluate method and
Public Key of Alice. Sally returns the results to Alice. Alice
decrypts the results locally using her Private Key.
The detail steps of protocol are mentioned in Table II
B. Security
In this simple setup, If cloud platform itself is compromised
by Mallory, FHE schemes guarantee the computational privacy
of Alice’s data. FHE schemes also guarantee that accidental or
intentional sharing of encrypted data with other users or service
provider’s would not leak anything.
1In communications the abstraction of plain text is message, but in compu-
tations data fits well.
2In all the protocols, such keys are given offline or got from trusted server
or any other safer means
TABLE I. CONVENTIONS FOR ALL PROTOCOLS
A,B,S Principal members Alice, Bob, Sally
PKp,SKp is a public,private key pair of principal p
auth-PKp,auth-SKp key pair of any principal P for Authentication
eval-PK,eval-SK key pair generated by FHE scheme
func(x) is an arbitrary function
data,x,y users data, input, output respectively to func
data1,x1, y1 are encryptions of data,x,y respectively
encrypt,decrypt,evaluate methods of FHE scheme
sign,verify signature and verify operations
TABLE II. BASIC PROTOCOL
Data Preparation
1 A := data1= encryptPKa (data)
2 A → S := data1
Protocol Steps
1 A := x1=encryptPKa (x)
2 A → S := (func,x1)
3 S := y1= evaluatePKa (func,x1,data1) (I.1)
4 S → A := (y1)
5 A := y = decryptSKa (y1)
If Mallory initiates a request with Sally, requesting arbi-
trary operations on Alice’s data then the results would still be
encrypted. Such requests could be avoided too by incorporating
authentication mechanisms using digital signatures
C. Example Use cases
• An End user subscribes for SaaS application like
Personal Finance Software.
• An Enterprise outsources their confidential data and
applications like financial , human resources records,
pay rolls processing to a IaaS provider.
V. MULTIUSER SHARED SECRET PROTOCOL
In many of use cases, users collaborate with their partners
while utilizing a cloud service. Let Alice, Bob be two such
partners. They both trust each other but don’t trust the service
provider Sally. Mallory is an adversary and not a legible
partner. The below protocol though is not restricted to two
users and scales to any number of users without loss of
generality.
Each of these users have their own Public, Private key
pairs. Encrypting the data with their respective Public keys will
not result in encrypted data that can be collectively operated
upon. At the same time if same key pair is shared among and
used by all the users then it would cause single point failure
if the keys are compromised. Also there would not be any
accountability on who made the change exactly if every one
uses same Public Keys.
A. Complementary Key Pairs
Two distinct types of key pairs are used together through
out the protocols. The key pairs complement each other to
achieve the required functionality.
1) Authentication key pair auth-Private, auth-Public
Keys for Users (Alice, Bob) to authenticate themselves
with Server (Sally). All the users and server have their
own respective auth pair.
2) Evaluation key pair eval-Private, eval-Public keys for
Users to execute arbitrary operations with Server. All
the legible users (partner’s of Alice) would have one
common Eval key pair. Server knows eval-Public key
only.
This is by design principle Separation of Concerns. Each key
pair is used for separate concern aka functionality.
B. Summary
Alice, her partners and Sally generate auth-Private, auth-
Public Keys, this can be either through traditional PKE
schemes or FHE. Alice also generates eval-Private, eval-Public
keys using FHE scheme. Alice ensures same Eval key pair to
be available with all her partners. Such sharing of Eval key
pair is reasonable and similar to having a pre shared secret in
Symmetric key crypto systems.
All the users authenticate themselves using their individual
auth key pairs while requesting any operations. The data
is encrypted with eval-Public key when any of the users
upload/write it to the cloud and results are decrypted with eval-
Private key locally at the users. Further the actual execution of
the operations are carried out by server using eval-Public and
Evaluate method of FHE scheme. Since the data is encrypted
under same eval-Public key by everyone, the encryptions by
multiple users are coherent.
The detail steps of protocol are mentioned in Table III.
Bob’s run of the protocol would be similar, by using his
authentication keys, without loss of generality.
C. Security
All the users use their own auth-keys used for authentica-
tion purposes. The actual encryption of the data is done using
eval-Public key. Since the encryption is done under single key
by all the users, its easy for the server to run Evaluate method
of FHE scheme. Similarly all the users (except the server) have
eval-Private key for decrypting the results locally.
Mallory cannot request for arbitrary operations over data
shared by Alice, Bob, such requests would be dropped while
verifying the signature since Sally knows the legible users.
If Mallory some how compromises any user’s auth-Private
TABLE III. MULTI USER SHARED SECRET PROTOCOL STEPS
Data Preparation
1 A := data1 = encrypteval-PK(data)
2 A→ S := signauth-SKa (data
1)
3 S := verifySigauth−PKa (signauth-SKa )
Protocol Steps
1 A := x1=encrypteval−PK (x)
2 A → S := signauth−SKa (func,x1)
3 S := verifySigauth−PKa (signauth−SKa )
4 S := y1= evaluateeval−PK (func,x1,data1) (I.1)
5 S → A := signauth−SKs (y1)
6 A := verifySigauth−PKs (signauth−SKs )
7 A := y = decrypteval−SK (y1)
key, she may successfully impersonate such user and request
arbitrary operations but she may not be able to decrypt
the results as that would need eval-Private key. Accidental
compromise of eval-Private key alone will not allow Mallory
to perform operations on the data since authentication is done
by auth key pair.
The security of the system depends though on adequate
measures for safer key distribution and authentication mecha-
nisms.
D. Example Use cases
In the below cases Eval key pair can be shared among Alice
and his partners.
• An Enterprise has its branch offices located at various
different locations. All the branches collectively need
to work over data and applications with remote cloud
Server.
• An End user wants to store his personal data with
cloud Server. It is very likely to share confidential
data with few other users (like family members).
VI. MULTI-USER CONSTRAINED SECRET PROTOCOL
A much richer context is where Alice authorizes her partner
users with different access control privileges. In many of real
world scenarios, a user would authorize partners to obtain
results of only certain operations. Also Alice would like to have
control on addition, deletion, revocation etc on the partner
users apart from authorizing granular access control.
Informally, Access control is authorizing subjects (users,
applications or processes) with certain levels of access to
various resources (files, devices etc ) and enforcing such
authorization when the resources are accessed. A generalized
model of all the traditional ones is Attribute Based Access
Control (ABAC)[15]. ABAC is an excellent choice for web
services like cloud computing due its feature richness[16].
We give a quick introduction to ABAC model. We continue
to use the complementary key pairs technique with additional
restrictions for access control. Although all the legible users
have the eval-Private key to decrypt the results they are further
constrained to perform only certain operations, thus the name
constrained secret protocol. We first show how access control
can be achieved on encrypted data using FHE schemes and
then use those techniques in the protocol.
A. Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC)
In ABAC model, permissions are defined based any
characteristics known as attributes. The attributes for subjects
and resources can be identifiers, names, title etc. ABAC also
has special kind of environmental attributes like current date,
security levels etc. A policy rule defined as a boolean function
of attributes to decide if a subject s can access a resource r
in a environment e as below.
canAccess = f(ATTR(s), ATTR(r), ATTR(e)) (VI.1)
An Administrator defines such attributes and also de-
cides such policy rules 3. They are stored in a Policy Rule
Base(PRB). A Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) is responsible
for receiving requests for authorization decisions and enforcing
them. PEP in turn takes help of Policy Decision Point (PDP)
to evaluate the validity of authorization request by processing
Policy Rules.
In our current cloud setup, The subjects are Alice,Bob.
Encrypted data fine grained as files or database records are
resources. Alice as the data owner takes the role of an
administrator, defines on the attributes for partner users and
resources. Alice also defines the policy rules she wants to grant
as privileges for her partners. Alice outsources such PRB to
Sally the server. Sally acts as both Policy Enforcement and
Decision Point. Also add,delete,revoke of partner users can be
achieved using the PRB. For example, absence of privileges
for a particular user in PRB can be considered as the user is
deleted or revoked.
In Cloud setting, Policy Rule Base(PRB) in plain form, at
the server, can leak information on the underlying data. For
example, if a policy rule as ”Carol can write to a file xyz.jpg”,
would leak information. For this reason, the PRB also need to
be encrypted so that server is oblivious of such details.
Server Oblivious - Attribute Based Access Control(SO-
ABAC) can be achieved using FHE schemes together with
Complementary Key Pairs technique introduced in previous
protocol. Attributes can be defined for users identified by their
respective auth-Public Keys. The resource identifiers can be
encrypted using eval-Public Key of FHE scheme. Enforcement
of such access privilege can be done, obliviously a.k.a blind-
foldedly, using Evaluate method for any user requesting access
for a resource.
3In reality attribute administrator and policy administrator can be different
too
TABLE IV. ADDITIONAL CONVENTIONS
PRB Policy Rule Base
PRB1 an encrypted PRB
s,r,e subject, resource, environment
ATTR(a) attribute for s ,r or e
ATTR1(a) attribute encrypted using eval-PK
verifyAccess verify access control method used by Sally
B. Summary
The current protocol is basically an extension of previous
protocol. Additional conventions followed are captured in
Table IV
In addition to previous protocol’s assumptions, Sally knows
that Alice is also the administrator and has the permissions to
manage the PRB. Initial data preparation would be same as
previous protocol. In addition, Alice defines PRB. Sally in turn
grants access to users as per encrypted PRB.
Alice as Administrator configures PRB and subsequently
Bob as partner user requests operations.
When an user requests certain operations, he/she needs to
send certain attributes. The attributes of a user Bob used for
identification is auth-PKb, there can be other attributes too.
The attributes for resource and environment depends on the
operation being requested lets assume they are r,e. All the
attributes and PRB are encrypted using eval-Public key.
ATTR1(a1...an) = encrypteval-PK(a1....an) ai ∈ s, r, e(VI.2a)
ATTR(s) = auth-PKb (VI.2b)
ATTR1(s) = encrypteval-PK(auth-PKb) (VI.2c)
PRB1 = encrypteval-PK(PRB) (VI.2d)
Policy enforcement decision can be done at the server using
the Evaluate method of FHE scheme as shown below, this
is later used in the protocol. Assume canAccess (VI.1) is a
boolean circuit of ABAC model.
verifyAccesseval-PK(func, ATTR1(a1..an))
= evaluateeval-PK(canAccess, func, ATTR1(a1..an), PRB1)
(VI.3)
The detail steps of protocol are mentioned in Table V.
Alice’s run of the protocol, as user, would be similar, by using
his authentication keys , without loss of generality.
C. Rekeying, Revocation and ReEncryption
If Bob’s auth key pair is compromised. He generates a new
key pair and sends the auth-Public key to Bob. Alice needs to
update the PRB with identification attribute of Bob containing
the new public key. If Alice needs to revoke a particular user,
TABLE V. MULTI USER CONSTRAINED SECRET PROTOCOL
PRB Preparation
1 A := PRB1 (VI.2d)
2 A → S := signauth−SKa (PRB1)
3 S := verifySigauth−PKa (signauth−SKa )
Protocol Steps
1 A := x1=encrypteval−PK (x)
2 A → S := signauth−SKb (func,x
1
,ATTR1(a1 ...an)) (VI.2a)
3 S := verifySigauth−PKb (signauth−SKb )
4 S := verifyAccesseval−PK (func,ATTR1(a1 ...an)) (VI.3)
5 S := y1= evaluateeval−PK (func,x1,data1) (I.1)
6 S → A := signauth−SKs (y1)
7 A := verifyauth−PKs (signauth−SKs )
8 A := y = decrypteval−SK (y1)
she creates and encrypts such a policy rule and sends a update
PRB request to Sally.
If eval-Private key is compromised, Alice generates a new
eval‘ key pair and distributes it to all the partner users. She lets
Sally know the new public key eval-PK‘ key and requests a
re-encryption of data. Sally executes the evaluate method with
the encryption circuit and new public key as below
reEncryption : evaluateeval−PK(encrypt, eval-PK‘, data1)
D. Security
If Mallory is not a legible partner but tries to access
resources that are forbidden, such requests are first thwarted
while verifying signature itself, since its assumed Sally knows
all legible users through some initial configuration. If Mal-
lory is legible partner but tries to access resources that are
forbidden, such requests are thwarted while verifying the
access control privileges. If Mallory tries to overwrite the PRB
itself, such requests are thwarted too since such administrative
operations are allowed by Sally only from Alice.
A risk exists though, If Mallory compromises the cloud
platform itself and corrupts the PRB or bypasses the access
check, this could result in a complete denial of service. But
such Single Point of Failure is inherent to cloud computing
model itself, there is a total denial of service to user due to
poor internet connectivity or if cloud service is down (either
due to technical problems or attacks).
E. Example Use cases
• Privacy of Health Records Hospitals can decide access
control on their data based on who their partners
are for example insurance, doctors, researchers etc.
Server can be completely blind about the data being
processed and also the access privileges for resources.
• Private Social Networking Each user can authorize,
who (friends, family, everyone etc) can access their
data (like photos, blogs etc) and this can be done
without the server ever knowing it.
VII. FUTURE WORK
We have assumed, in our protocols, the cloud server would
be honest in performing the computations correctly, in real
world such assumptions cannot be made. Accidentally or
malicious execution of arbitrary computations over encrypted
data might effect the results and/or render data useless too. For
this reason, verifiability of the computations is very important.
Current verifiability techniques are nascent [8][17][18]. En-
hancing such techniques and tailoring them into the above
protocols would be for further work. Rigorous proofs of
security protocols for computational privacy can be achieved
when verifiability of computations is integrated with them.
Current FHE schemes are highly inefficient and theoretical
to conduct experiments and provide results. Also Cloud Com-
putational Privacy protocols being nascent, there aren’t any
theoretical frameworks to best capture their security require-
ments and conduct rigorous analysis. The current popularly
used Universal Composability framework has its own limita-
tions [19] to be applied directly to cloud protocols.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We introduced complementary key pairs technique for
multi user scenarios.Three protocols which cater to gamut of
use cases of cloud computing identified by the community
[20] are presented in our work. Also we showed that FHE
schemes for single user can be scaled to multi user scenario
too and no special variants of FHE schemes are required for
the same. These protocols make no assumptions on underlying
schemes, this gives them flexibility of adapting them to any
FHE schemes. We also showed how oblivious (blind-folded)
access control over encrypted data can be achieved using FHE
schemes.
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